How the rise of Asia and the Indo-Pacific is affecting the global order and contributing to multipolarity is being widely discussed. A closer look at what this really means is required.
Global order means peace and security and an authority to maintain that internationally. Theoretically, the UN is tasked with that the role and authority. But it has proved to be ineffective.
Whatever the “order” that exists is the product of US and European powers. Asia has had no role in its establishment. When the framework of this “order” was established, Asia was still largely colonised. Japan had been defeated and had not risen. South Korea was a poor developing country.
This “order” over the years has been preserved through military domination, economic strength, control over the global financial system, military interventions, regime changes, imposition of western values, an interventionist discourse of human rights and democracy etc. The short point is that “global order” is not a neutral concept. It is embedded in western hegemony.
Juxtaposing the rise of Asia and “global order” implies that the established “order” is being challenged. It is thus seen as “disruptive”.
The rise of Asia, however, is not a new phenomenon. Japan rose a long time ago. South Korea has risen too, and so has the ASEAN. But this rise was not seen as disruptive. China’s rise is an established fact, and it is seen as disruptive. India is now rising too, but because India is not challenging the West, its rise is not seen as unsettling for the “global order”.
The rise of Japan and South Korea and even ASEAN could actually appear as a consolidation of the “global order”, as these countries were allies of the US, and therefore not disruptive in terms of balance
of power. They could be seen as additional stakeholders in the existing West-dominated system. Japan’s phenomenal economic revival and its export volumes were, however, seen as a challenge and this was addressed through the 1985 Plaza accords at Japan’s cost.
It is China’s rise that has raised concerns about its impact on the existing West created and dominated world order. China is now the biggest manufacturing power (30% of global manufacturing is located in China), the second largest economy and the biggest exporting country. It is also developing its military power, and possesses the world’s largest navy, besides expanding its nuclear and missile arsenals. China is carving out its own sphere of influence through military means in the western Pacific and through its economic power across the continents.
But, because of globalisation and its WTO membership, China is also closely linked to the existing “global order” from which it has immensely profited, even as it is seen as challenging it. The Asian upholders of the ‘global order”- Japan and South Korea- have massive economic ties with China, as does the ASEAN, including Vietnam. These countries cannot disentangle themselves from China as their economies would suffer hugely. Japan and others joining the RCEP shows how important China is economically to them. Japan has even pressed India to join the RCEP. On the other hand, to reduce their dependence on China, both Japan and South Korea seek to pursue a China plus policy.
The impact of “rising Asia” on the “global order” has, thus, contradictory elements in it. Within this “rising Asia”, even while maintaining strong economic ties with China, countries also to seek to deter it, but without provoking a conflict. This gives China space to pursue its present strategy of aggrandisement in slices without inviting a real military clash. It is using threats, backed by rising military power, to actually deter others whose sovereign interests it breaches.
India’s rise is more recent. It is not seen as disruptive in the same way as that of China’s. India wants to carve out a greater role for itself internationally, aspires to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeks a reform of the international political and financial institutions, is wedded to its strategic autonomy, and is positioning itself more emphatically as a voice of the Global South. At the same time, however, it is expanding its ties with the US and the West in general. The US is its biggest partner today. Even as it is a member of BRICS and the SCO, India is also a member of the Quad and is committed to the Indo-Pacific concept. It participates regularly in G 7 meetings as an invitee.
But India too has very substantial economic ties with China, even as its political ties with China are tense. The two countries are locked up in a military confrontation on the border. India supports a multipolar world, as it is only such a world where power is dispersed in recognition of the shifts in power away from the West that India can have a bigger international role, but for New Delhi the prerequisite for this is a multipolar Asia. China and India, as the two biggest powers of Asia, are rising together at the same time, which, without some understanding between them on the Asian and international space each could occupy without conflict, the move towards multipolarity would be more complicated,
A multipolar Asia is way to go for that.
China and India, as the two largest powers in Asia, are rising simultaneously. Without mutual understanding on the Asian and international spaces each can occupy without conflict, the move toward multipolarity would become more complicated.
The rise of Asia is therefore not a collective peaceful rise. Many conflicts exist in rising or risen Asia: those between China and Japan, China and South Korea, Japan and South Korea to some extent, and between China and India.
The concept of the Indo-Pacific and its translation into cooperative mechanisms is essentially centred around the China challenge. There is no logical need to link the security of the Indian and Pacific oceans if China were not a threat and did not need to be deterred.
Japan, South Korea, ASEAN together with India do not threaten the Indo-Pacific space. China does, with its policies in the South and East China seas, threats to Taiwan, territorial disputes with India, its maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean that includes strategic connectivity through Pakistan and Myanmar to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, its strategy of building and controlling ports and establishing bases, and so on. This has inevitably led to seeing the security in the Indian Ocean and the western pacific as organically linked.
The irony is that rising Asia cannot by itself maintain order in Asia. It needs the US as a key partner, as only the US has the core military power to deter China. The US has bases, military deployments, and alliances in the region. For Japan, the US nuclear umbrella is vital for its security. Japan has also to contend with the regional threat from North Korea.
India too is strengthening its defence ties with the US. It is acquiring platforms and weaponry from the US with the China challenge also in view. It has signed all the foundational defence agreements with the US. It is ready to do burden sharing in the Indo-Pacific region by protecting the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean which are vital, not just for Japan and South Korea but also for its own energy and trade requirements.
India’s navy is the strongest local navy in the Indian Ocean. It has conducted Malabar exercises with the US since the 1990s. Japan and Australia have joined much later. India’s role in the Indo-Pacific strategy is much wider in scope than that of the Quad because India is also cooperating with France in this area, in particular in the western Indian Ocean to monitor the Chinese presence there.
However, India is not dependent on America for its security. It has stood up to China in the Himalayas. China senses its vulnerability to Indian naval power in the Indian Ocean as it has for the moment no bases there (except Djibouti) that can sustain its long-term naval presence in the region.
The concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific primarily applies to the western Pacific, where China’s maritime claims-its so-called 9-Dash
Line-aim to turn these waters into a “Beijing lake,” as former Japanese Prime Minister Abe described it. It does not extend to the Indian Ocean, as there are no conflicting maritime claims in this region. In fact, the situation is the reverse, as China seeks a free and open Indian Ocean, where its movements could be constrained by chokepoints like the Malacca Straits.
The rise of Asia and the Indo-Pacific in the “global order” has many dimensions, both in terms of challenging Western dominance and cooperating with the West to maintain peace and security in Asia.
(Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and Deputy Chief Of Mission in Washington.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
